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Urban Identity and Transitional Politics:
The Transformation of Political Allegiance Inside Amiens
Before and After the City's 1594 Capitulation to Henry IV
Annette Finley-Croswhite
Old Dominion University
I will begin this paper by defining terms. By "urban identity" I mean the "perceptions of
urbanites," religious, social, and/or political in nature, that molded the motives, loyalties,
and fears of city-dwellers in Amiens. I am interested in these "perceptions" because I
want to know how Catholic Leaguers metamorphosed into royalists between 1588 and
1594. Primarily I consider elite culture, the wealthy lawyers, merchants, and churchmen
who commandeered Amiens's leadership positions, but in examining the elite, I also will
try to make a few observations about the "identity" of the populace at large. I do not deal
with the more obvious stimuli motivating the populace toward the League or royalist
camps such as religious fervor, Henry IV's abjuration, or the course of the religious wars.
By focusing on urban identity in Amiens during the period of the Catholic League's
ascendancy, I also want to suggest answers to questions raised by Robert Descimon in
his examination of the League in Paris. Thanks to Descimon, we know a good deal about
the Parisian League, but with the exception of Rouen and Toulouse, we know substan
tially less about the provincial League experience.1 For Descimon the personal motives
behind the Parisian League leaders were kindled by a defense and reinvigoration of
communal virtues and civic liberties. Imbued with religious zeal, the Leaguers recreated
an urban sociability that harkened back to a medieval ideal of patriotism and civic
responsibility. For a time, at least, the Paris Sixteen held the state at bay and reinvented
the medieval commune.2 This argument is provocative and ground breaking, but what I
hope to determine are some alternative reasons that might explain the rise and demise of
the Catholic League in Picardy's capital city.3 Specifically, I want to know what the
perceptions or motives undergirding Amiens's League can tell us about the nature or
"identity" of urbanites in early modern culture.
Overwhelmingly Leaguers in Amiens greatly resembled their Politique counterparts.4
Thus, unlike the Parisian League model, artisans did not infiltrate the municipal
government, which remained in Amiens solidly merchant-bourgeois. Yet what is
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particularly intriguing about the nature of the political/religious allegiance in Amiens is
that the divisions that formed between Leaguer and Politique city leaders in 1588, after
the "Day of the Barricades" and before the assassinations at Blois, remained solid
throughout the period of Catholic League domination. This can be proven by the fact that
in 1588 Henry III received a letter naming all of the League leaders in the city as well as
his own royalist allies. Neither the murders at Blois nor the ascension of a Protestant king
altered significantly the ranks of these two groupings. Henry Ill's loyal servants named in
the document happened to be the very same men who opened Amiens 's gates to Henry
IV's royalist commanders in 1594. Of course there were desertions from the "Holy
Union" over the course of its five-and-one-half-year existence as partisans gradually grew
weary of life under the League, but most of the Leaguers named on this 1588 list either
made the leap to the king's cause in the ninth hour on the eve of Amiens's capitulation or
they remained true to their beliefs and left with the League governor of Picardy, the duc
d'Aumale, when he was expelled from the city in August 1594.5
The way in which the League took form in Amiens and the way it fell apart tells us a
good deal about the motives of urbanites. Just as in other towns, uncertainty surrounding
Henry III fueled pre-League anxiety on the part of Amiens's citizenry. In 1587, for
example, rumor circulated that the king intended to place a garrison in Amiens as well as
to construct a citadel. The word "citadel" roused such fear in the Amiénois that League
leaders employed it to excite crowds gathered at the municipal assembly hall.6 The
townspeople possessed a proud exemption from such treatment in their communal
charter and were determined to prevent any tampering with the esteemed privilege. The
citadel issue was an important consideration among the increasing numbers of anti-
royalists who urged the city's citizenry to join the "Holy League."7 Amiens did so on 19
May 1588 shortly after the "Day of the Barricades."
The assassinations of the duc de Guise and his brother, the Cardinal de Lorraine, on
24 December 1588 radicalized the Catholic Leaguers in Amiens as elsewhere. Four days
after the assassinations. Leaguers representing the clergy, nobility, presidial court, bour
geoisie, and the municipal government voted to sever ties with the crown and to create
an assembly called the "Chamber of the Estates of Picardy" to administer both the town
of Amiens and the province of Picardy. Municipalities throughout the region were
invited to send delegates to this new institution. Amiens's municipal magistrates
exuberantly supported the "Chamber" and quickly transformed the echevinage into its
enforcement arm. Thereafter, acting for the "Chamber," they expanded their control over
all areas of local administration.8 A majority of city leaders no longer recognized Henry
III, and when letters from the king addressed to Amiens's mayor and municipal coun
cilors arrived in the city on 12 January 1589, they were tossed unopened into a fire.9
League police squads appointed by the city government rounded up, imprisoned, and
fined Politiques, royalists, and Huguenots.10 In the wake of the Guise murders, moreover,
city leaders persuaded the Amienois populace to relinquish royalist allegiances and to
espouse the religious zealotry of the League." The municipality instructed all parish
priests to preach sermons that would stir the emotions of the people for the League, and
the Leaguer bishop of Amiens, Geoffrey de la Martonnie, charged his priests, canons,
and clerics likewise.12 Processions increased and the townspeople were ordered under
penalty of fine to decorate the front of their houses for the League by hanging green
banners, the colors of Lorraine and hence the League, from their windows. Other visual
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images excited the people. A priest at the church of Saint-Leu, for instance, ordered two
large paintings mounted beneath his pulpit depicting in gruesome detail the assassina
tions at Blois.13 Placards also appeared denouncing the king and the royalist governor of
Picardy, Henry I d'Orléans, duc de Longueville.14
In the formation of Amiens 's seditious government, Parisian influence was impor
tant. Deputies sent from Paris encouraged the Amiénois to join the "Holy League," and
once the "General Council of Union" was formed in France's capital, Amiens's city
government kept deputies there. At one point the échevinage even discussed sending
money to the Paris Sixteen." Even the chronology of League history in Amiens lagged
slightly behind the Parisian experience.16 Yet the thrust of Amiens's "Chamber of the
Estates of Picardy" was to try to build regional strength, and if ever it could be argued
that Amiens sought autonomous control of the province, evidence can be found in the
few remaining documents left by the Chamber. Clearly, Amiens's League leaders hoped
to control taxation in Picardy and encouraged the centralization of regional tax monies in
the Chamber's hands. Abbeville, Peronne, Montdidier, and Noyon dispatched regular
deputations to Amiens and for a time complied deferentially with the Picard capital.
Amiens's leaders offered money, supplies, troops, and munitions to these and other
towns and viewed themselves as the protectors of the province."
Within Amiens, power was concentrated in the hands of city leaders connected to
mighty patrons. They in turn influenced their friends, families, and neighborhoods.
Vincent Le Roy, lieutenant-general at the presidial court, was one of Amiens's most
important and notorious Leaguers. A client of the duc de Mayenne, Le Roy greatly
benefitted from his association with the duke. The officer virtually controlled Amiens's
government during the League, and around 1590 Mayenne made him his right hand man
in the city and turned him into something akin to an intendant. The duke instructed Le
Roy to control the accounts of the bureau of finances as well as to search out and try
persons guilty of anti-League activity.18 During this same period (1590-91), Le Roy's
brother Nicholas served in the échevinage and went on personal missions for the ducs de
Mayenne and d'Aumale." Charles de Lorraine, the duc d'Aumale, resided in Amiens
often during the League's ascendancy and placed his clients in key positions throughout
the city as well. All three Pécoul brothers, for example, were his clients: André, a royal
notary; Claude, a procurator and municipal magistrate; and Adrien, a canon at Amiens's
Notre Dame cathedral.20 The Pecouls had Spanish connections, and Claude even took an
oath of allegiance to the king of Spain. He received a seigniory and 6000 livres from
d'Aumale, and when the Spanish surprised and captured Amiens in 1597, the duke made
Pécoul mayor.21 D'Aumale frequently intervened in Amiens's municipal elections to
ensure his clients sat on the echevinage. In 1593 when his client Antoine de Berny failed
to win a mayoral election, the duke left a tennis match and marched to the city hall where
he installed forcefully his man as mayor.22 Amiens's other great source of patronage,
Bishop Geoffrey de la Martonnie, also exerted a commanding influence over not only the
church establishments but the secular government as well. His clients held positions in
the city government, as was the case with Francois Bignant in 1590 and 1591. Bignant's
brother was a canon at the cathedral.23
Just as the AmUnois' concern for urban privileges and regional ties and the ram
ifications of their patron-client relations tell us a good deal about the formation of the
Catholic League, they can also tell us about its breakup. By summer 1594 things were
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going badly for the ducs de Mayenne and d'Aumale as the situation inside Amiens
deteriorated and more and more townspeople longed to reopen communications with
Henry IV. The city government was losing control, especially after Paris capitulated, and
became divided between those who wanted to settle with the king and those who pre
ferred to remain in the League.24 But if Mayenne's followers were switching sides, he
was his own worst enemy. In late July he personally sent over five hundred mandates to
suspected pro-royalist bourgeois ordering them to leave the city, but when the city
leaders learned of his intentions, even the League magistrates became angered since this
was a command they felt only they had the prerogative to give. The municipality refused
to force the bourgeois to leave, and Mayenne became so angered that he threatened to
plant his guidon in the market square and direct his troops to burn and sack the city.25
The introduction of troops was a major stumbling block since throughout the spring
Mayenne had wanted to bring contingents of Spanish forces into Amiens, but each time
the issue was raised, the municipal leaders condemned the idea.26 In 1594 the magistrates
feared he planned to call in the Spanish anyway.
Regional problems were another major issue contributing to the League's decline in
Amiens. It was natural in time of war for key towns in any province to ally and support
each other. This was particularly true in Picardy since familial alliances existed between
the magisterial elite of many towns. Robert de Sachy, for example, held the office of
échevin nine times between 1589 and 1602. His father and brother, moreover, both
served as mayor of Doullens during the same period. Similarly, the mayor of Abbeville,
Jean de Maupin, married his daughter to a Louvencourt, an Amiénois family strongly tied
to the échevinage?7 Yet if familial alliances helped to solidify a province, competition
between cities served to destroy such unity. In 1589, in the wake of League excitement,
Abbeville's government seemed willing to work with Amiens. This cooperation ended
when Abbeville's leaders began to see their interests compromised. Economic rivalry
had always been strong between the three main cities in Picardy, Amiens, Abbeville, and
Saint-Quentin, and interestingly enough, Saint-Quentin remained solidly royalist during
the League wars. Abbeville went Leaguer but eventually grew disenchanted with Amiens
and sent fewer and fewer delegations to the city. The "friendship" ended when Abbeville
decided to strengthen its own regional influence in Picardy. Thus, during the period 1591
to 1594, Abbeville relied less and less on Amiens and allied and protected League towns
in its immediate vicinity along the Atlantic coast of the province.28 In the end, Abbeville's
inhabitants prided themselves on surpassing Amiens by becoming the first League city in
Picardy to capitulate to Henry IV. 29
Probably the single most important factor leading to the League's demise had to do
with Henry IV's clients living and waiting inside the city. At no time during the Catholic
League domination of Amiens was the city's municipal government ever entirely Leaguer
or entirely royalist. Amiens's municipal magistrates split over the sedition issue from the
day they voted to enter the "Holy Union." Jehan de Collemont, mayor in 1588, was also
a client of Henry III. During crucial deliberations he warned his colleagues that joining
the League might eventually threaten the city's privileges. Collemont backed down and
begrudgingly accepted the League, but five years later, he and his familymen played a
vital role in the royalist takeover.30 Between 1588 and 1594, the municipality in Amiens
consisted of a large number of zealous Leaguers, many known royalists, and perhaps a
majority who walked the line between the two. Frequently, the royalist échevins suffered
56
ne te inley- roswhite 
  r  e   ayenne   u ale   n de iens 
riorated  re  re le   pen ications t  
 . e  ernment s  ,  ter s itulated,  
e ided een se  anted   t     se  -
red  in   .:1  t  ayenne's lo ers re t ing es,  
s s   y.  t  ly   t  e dred dates  
ected royalist e is ing     t ,    t  
ers rned   t tions,   e  istrates e red ce s 
s         rogative   e ality sed 
     e,  a e ne a e  red   tened  
ant     et re    ps      ity. :z, 
e t ction     r ing ck  ut   
a e e  ted   tingents     iens, t  e 
 e  sed,  l ers demned  ea. 26    istrates 
red         
nal  re ther  e ting   ea ue's   
iens. t s ral  e        ince    ort 
 r. is as ly   car  ce ial a  isted een 
  t   y  rt       ice  
e     9  . s   t , er,  
ed    <>ullens   e iod. ilarly,    bbe i le, 
e   a in,   hter   uvencourt,  e is    
  e inage.21 et  ial ia e  ped  ify  ce,  
een  ed  t y  ity.  ,   e  e  itement, 
bbevi le's  ed i    t  iens. is  ed 
 bbeville's ers an    terests ised. no ic ry 
   t g een      , iens, e i le,  
uentin,   ugh, Saint- uentin ained ly ist  
 e  ars. bbe i le ent e  t   senchanted t  iens 
 t    legations   . e iendship" ed  bbe i le 
ided  t then    lue ce  . s,   i  1 
 , bbe i le  s    iens  ie   tected e   
  ediate inity   tlantic st   vince.211   , bbevi le's 
abitants i  selves  r assing iens  i   r t ea    
ar   itulate   . 29 
   st rt t     ea ue's ise    
t  e r  's ie t  ing  ting   . t     ic 
eague   iens s  t 's  ernment r  e  
  t  iens's al istrates t    e   
 t  ted  t r  ly  e a   lle ont,   , as  
 ie t   . ring l     lea   ining 
 e  t l  ten  t 's ileges. lemont ked   
 epted  e  t  rs t r,    ly en   
    st ver.30 e    ,  i i ality  iens 
sisted   l e    e , y n ist ,  r aps  
t   e    een   r tl ,  ist e ins  
 
Urban Identity and Transitional Politics
imprisonment for their anti-League activities, but they soon obtained their freedom, only
to be jailed again at a later date.31 Orders from the municipal government expelled many
royalists from the city, but they always managed to return. The city government, in fact,
made quite a profit from fining royalists for their anti-League activities and from
confiscating their goods and later selling them back to them. By 1594, however, the
king's clients had achieved the upper hand and converted enough of Amiens's populace
that the people rioted in favor of Henry IV. Augustin de Louvencourt, Robert Correur,
Francois d'Aguesseau, Jehan Postel, Jehan de Cordelois, Michel de Suyn, and Adrien de
Maroeuil were just a few of the échevins who associated first with Henry III and then
with Henry IV throughout the 1588 to 1594 period. They worked consistently from the
creation of the League in Amiens to bring about its demise. In the end, they manned the
barricades erected between 5 and 7 August 1594, and once street fighting ended, they
chased the duc d'Aumale and his clients out of the city.32 Ennobled following the
capitulation, these staunch royalists completely dominated the municipal government
after 1597 when Henry decreased and reorganized the échevinage. From then until the
king's assassination in 1610, only one formerly zealous Leaguer managed to win a place
on the city council."
What then were the people's motives inside Amiens for supporting or denouncing the
League or the monarchy? The period of the Catholic League in the towns is often por
trayed in texts as a sort of swan song for the medieval commune. Ardent Leaguers fired
with religious enthusiasm are seen asserting their autonomy, defending their privileges,
and avowing their civic responsibility. Perhaps this was the case, but it may not have
been the entire scenario. Regional allegiances and rivalries played an important role in
motivating people for or against the League, and these situations deserve further study. It
seems to have been the case that often one city in a province supported the League while
its neighbor remained royalist. This is what occurred with Amiens and Saint-Quentin in
Picardy, Rouen and Caen in Normandy, CMlons-sur-Marne and Vitry-le-Francois in
Champagne, Clermont-Ferrand and Riom in Auvergne, and certainly with many others.
Arguably, the attachment to communal privileges in Amiens was strong. Yet this
may have resulted less from a revived communal spirit and more from a fear of the
repercussions of the loss of privileges. All early modern cities disdained the introduction
of troops into their midst because of the economic dislocation and personal injury these
actions could cause. If ever the crown or the nobility threatened the towns, it was in this
area. I know of no town that ever revolted because a king or nobleman interfered with
election rights and manipulated their outcomes. The same can not be said with regard to
the introduction of troops. In 1588 when Amiens feared the construction of a citidel, the
town leaders exalted their urban privilege and adopted the League. In 1594 when
Mayenne menaced Amiens with his own troops, the town trumpeted the same privilege
and opted for the king. In 1597 when Henry IV wanted to use Swiss troops to bolster
Amiens's urban militia in case of Spanish attack, the magistrates clung once again to
their privileged exemption and rejected the king's offer. Shortly thereafter the city fell to
the Spanish.
Clientage and its role in the towns is another issue that merits future research. The
royalist duc de Longueville enjoyed a solid power base in Saint-Quentin but was less
highly revered in Amiens.34 It should come as no surprise then that while the city leaders
in Amiens drew up an oath of loyalty in support of the League, the municipal magistrates
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in Saint-Quentin devised an anti-League pledge. The continued presence of royalists in
Amiens during the League years is also of interest. They worked steadily, consciously,
and directly from the beginning of the League to bring about its downfall. The royalist
families were united by ties of marriage and kinship, and they utilized fictive kinship ties
and economic leverage to influence their parishes and neighborhoods.35 Whole blocks of
parishes were known to the municipal government during the League as either pro-
League or Politique, and, thus, when the royalist coup occurred in August 1594, neigh
borhoods battled it out until the royalists finally won. The most important aspect of the
clientage issue in Amiens, however, was that the lines that divided Leaguer and royalist
city leaders were drawn clearly in 1588 and waffled very little thereafter.
I see little evidence, therefore, in a revived communal spirit in Amiens stretching
deep into the heart of the populace. Urban sociabilities pre-dated the formation of the
Catholic League and do not really explain why one neighborhood supported the League
while another favored the king.36 If anything, the League leaders seem to have acted like
tyrants. They enacted stringent legislation that curtailed the freedom of the people, and
they manipulated their beliefs and emotions. Told originally to defend the League, in the
end the part of the population that tried to remain fervent was suddenly encouraged to
recognize the king. Vincent Le Roy and his brother Nicholas, for example, rode through
their neighborhood on the eve of Amiens 's capitulation waving white feathers as a sign
to their followers to switch sides.37 For several years after 1594, moreover, League
adherents continued to live in the city and many may have felt abandoned. This would
explain why on a rampart wall in late 1596 when Andnf Pecoul showed up for militia
duty—the same André who had supported the League but who also made the timely
switch to the king's side in 1594—he confronted an angry League defender who
threatened him. On that night Pecoul was met by a militia captain, Philippe Otiger, who
first terrorized him and eventually wounded him with a knife after crying repeatedly that
Pecoul had betrayed the "Holy Union."38 For those ideologically confused at the
capitulation, League sentiment remained strong and undoubtedly contributed to the
Spanish capture of Amiens in 1597.
In summation, I believe that the "identity" of urbanites in Amiens was tied directly to
issues affecting privileges, regional matters, and particularly clientage. We know that
urban leaders controlled their neighborhoods through their influence and status and could
motivate or prevent factional strife and violence. They were the great patrons of the
populace. Why one magistrate, Augustin de Louvencourt, chose to support the king in
1588 and another, Antoine de Berny, adopted the League is perhaps the greater question.
Concern for city privileges and regional issues undoubtedly influenced individual
decisions, but before the assassinations at Blois men like Louvencourt and De Berny had
already made their choice based upon their clientship status. Louvencourt and his
familymen and women sided with the king; Berny and his chose d'Aumale. There was
no slow "transformation" of Leaguers over the 1588 to 1594 period, only a gradual
changing of sides of the populace. Very few Leaguers metamorphosed into royalists until
the last moments before the capitulation when being on the winning side caused the most
ardent yet ambitious of Leaguers to shift allegiances. Their "identities," perceptions, and
agendas had long been established. And, yet, their "identity" greatly affected the heart of
the city, and Henry IV understood this. How else can we explain that after the recapture
of Amiens in 1597, even though he offered a generous pardon to ex-Leaguers, the king
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also made sure that only long-standing royalists held municipal posts in the city
government and captainships in the urban militia?39 How else could Henry IV assure
himself that on the streets, corners, and back alleys of Amiens, La Rochelle, Nantes, and
any other city, his people would be loyal?
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